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AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF SELF-DEFENSE
MARY ELLEN O'CONNELL*
Following the September 11 th attacks in the United States (U.S.), one could make
a case for America's use of force in Afghanistan as a lawful exercise of the right of
self-defense.' But the proposals to invade Iraq following September 11 th cannot
be so defended. Those proposals did not concern defending the basic security of
the U.S. in the sense that basic security defense is currently understood in the
international community. They concerned, rather, defense of a more expansive
concept of security, a concept wherein the U.S. need not tolerate antagonistic
regimes with the potential to harm U.S. interests. The invasion plans represent a
view that the United States is a privileged nation with more rights than others.2
Under this view, the United States may invade Iraq and remove Iraq's leader,
Saddam Hussein, because he poses an indefinite future threat, the type of threat a
superpower need not live with, though all other states must.
The belief in American exceptionalism has been part of American thinking
since the country's founding. Officials in the Reagan Administration, especially
Jeanne Kirkpatrick and Allan Gerson, applied this thinking to international law
rules on the use of force.4 The belief also appears in the Clinton Administration
policies of Madeleine Albright and William Cohen regarding the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) and its right to use force without United Nations
(U.N.) Security Council authorization.5 American exceptionalism is fully evident
on the part of those who proposed invading Iraq in the aftermath of September
11 th, especially Paul Wolfowitz and Richard Cheney. The position taken by other
governments - that an invasion of Iraq without Security Council authorization
would be an act of aggression - has not been answered by the Bush
William B. Saxbe Designated Professor of Law, The Ohio State University.
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3. See, e.g., Robert Weisberg, Values, Violence and the Second Amendment: American
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(1989).
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Administration. 6 A justification under law was not part of the Administration's
public position when it began discussing an invasion.7
This is one of the rare occasions since the adoption of the U.N. Charter that
the United States has been so disinterested in international law as to not provide an
explanation as to how a major use of armed force would comply with the law.
Another time was in 1999 in respect to the bombing of Yugoslavia.8 The
significance of this is not that the United States has always acted consistently with
international law and now suddenly it is not. The United States has plainly
violated international law on the use of force in the past. The difference is that
now the prevailing view sees no need to offer explanations. The United States
need not show how it has acted consistently with the principles of the community.
The United States is above the law. That is a significant departure from the past
that may well have serious negative consequences for future legal restraints on the
use of force.
This paper is about the current and future law of self-defense. It applies the
law to Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and to a proposed invasion of
Iraq in light of the circumstances prevailing in Spring 2002. The analysis shows
that while Enduring Freedom was arguably lawful, an invasion of Iraq would
indeed be an act of aggression. The discussion then turns to the impact an
invasion, or even the planning for an invasion, would have on the legal regime for
restraining force. Because international law's structure is based on the members'
equality under the law, 9 treating the United States exceptionally in a matter as
grave as an unlawful invasion will have serious consequences for the future legal
regime for restraining the use of force. The thesis of this paper is not necessarily
to defend the old order. The aim is a more modest one: pointing out how that order
is changing.
I. THE LAW OF SELF-DEFENSE
International law generally prohibits the use of force except in self-defense or
with the authorization of the U.N. Security Council.10 The right of self-defense
6. Neil MacFarquhar, Arabs Approve an Offer to Israel With Conditions It has Rejected, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 29, 2002, at Al.
7. One of the most complete accounts of what invasion planners had in mind as of Spring 2002 is
found in Thom Shanker & David E. Sanger, U.S. Envisions Blueprint on Iraq Including Big Invasion
Next Year, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2002, at 1.
8. The bombing began March 24, 1999. No official legal position was presented. The State
Department Legal Adviser's Office did put forward a more general statement about the legality of the
bombing May 11 at the International Court of Justice in arguing the Court had no jurisdiction in a case
brought by Yugoslavia. Legality of Use of Force (Yugo. v. U.S.), 1999 I.C.J. Pleadings (Verbatim
Record: Request for the indication of provisional measures), para. 1.7 (11 May 1999), available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iyall/iyall-cr/iyalliyusicr99241999051 l.html (last visited
September 27, 2002).
9. U.N. CHARTER, art. 2, para. 1 59 Stat. 1031. T.S. No. 993,3 Bevans 1153, amended24 U.S.T.
2225, T.I.A.S. 7739 [hereinafter U.N. CHARTER].
10. The most basic principle regulating the use of force in international law, refers only to "force"
and not to "armed force":
VOL. 3 1:1
AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM
allows the use of an armed force against an armed attacker when that force can
prevent future attacks and is proportional to the threat. These circumstances
arguably existed on October 7, 2001, when the United States and the United
Kingdom launched Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. The necessary
circumstances did not exist in Spring 2002 when the Bush administration openly
discussed invading Iraq. A state may still use force when conditions do not permit
self-defense, if the U.N. Security Council authorizes the force." But in the case of
Iraq, no sufficient authorization existed when the plan to invade was formed. The
discussion below begins with self-defense, then turns to the U.N. Security Council
authorization.
A. THE LAW OF SELF-DEFENSE
An armed response in self-defense is lawful when four conditions are met:
I. An armed attack has occurred;
2. The response is aimed at the armed attacker;
3. The response has the purpose of preventing future attacks;
4. The response is necessary to remove the threat and is proportional in the
circumstances. 
12
United Nation Charter Article 51 mandates that force in self-defense may only be
used to respond to an armed attack. 13  The International Court of Justice
[hereinafter ICJ] in the Nicaragua Case in 1986 provided an authoritative
interpretation of Article 51.14 The Court found the "attack" refers only to acts in
Article 51 which could amount to an actual armed attack. Moreover, such acts
must amount to significant force. The Court, relying on the General Assembly's
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.
U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4; see also generally on use of force: YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION
AND SELF-DEFENSE (3d ed. 2001); CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE
(2000); HILAIRE MCCOUBREY & NIGEL D. WHITE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARMED CONFLICT
(1992); IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES (1963).
11. U.N. CHARTER art. 51
12. But see Robert F. Teplitz, Taking Assassination Attempts Seriously: Did the United States
Violate International Law in Forcefully Responding to the Iraqi Plot to Kill George Bush?, 28
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 569, 576-583 (1995) (discussing the rules established by the Caroline case and
their interaction with U.N. Charter art. 51).
13. U.N. CHARTER art. 51:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective
self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the
Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and
security. Measures taken by members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall
be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the
authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at
any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international
peace and security.
14. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14,
102 (June 27)[hereinafter Nicaragua].
2002
AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM
Definition of Aggression, held that "'armed attack' means 'sending by or on behalf
of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts
of armed force against another State of such gravity as to amount to' (inter alia) an
actual armed attack conducted by regular forces...., 5
The Court assessed U.S. claims that the United States used force on the
territory of Nicaragua in lawful collective self-defense of El Salvador. After
considering U.S. arguments that Nicaragua had first used unlawful force, the Court
concluded that the evidence did not prove Nicaragua had first used force
significant enough to trigger lawful collective self-defense.
The facts of Nicaragua did not invite the Court to consider the problem of
when self-defense may actually begin. In the circumstances of the case, attacks
were on-going and the question was one of significance in respect to what the
United States characterized as the first armed attack to trigger the fighting -
shipments of weapons by the Nicaraguan government to rebels fighting the
government of El Salvador. The Court only had evidence of low-level shipments,
which it found did not amount to an armed attack. 16 We have no judicial decision
on the question of when self-defense to an armed attack may begin. International
lawyers have reached consensus that just as in the case of individual self-defense
in domestic law, the state need not wait to suffer the actual blow before defending
itself, but it must be sure the blow is coming.
The United States and United Kingdom discussed the conditions giving rise to
the right of self-defense in the Caroline Case. 17 They concluded that a state is on
solid legal ground to begin self-defense when the "[n]ecessity of that self-defense
is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for
deliberation."' 8
In the case of Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, the September 11 th attack
was clearly an armed attack that could give rise to self-defense should other
conditions be met. The U.N. Security Council referred in two resolutions to the
right to resort to self-defense in the context of September 11 th.' 9 No state argued
that such attacks should not give rise to self-defense.
This is the only event since World War II that has given rise to a U.S. use of
force in its own defense. The United States is justifiably worried about states, like
Iraq, possessing weapons of mass destruction. But mere possession of such
weapons without more is not an act amounting to an armed attack. In the ICJ's
advisory opinion in Nuclear Weapons Case, the Court held the use of nuclear
weapons would be unlawful except in "an extreme circumstance of self-defense,"
15. Nicaragua, supra note 14 at 103.
16. Id at 119.
17. JOHN BASSETr MOORE, 2 A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 412 (1906); see also
McCouBREY & WHITE, supra note 10, at 91-96; OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY
AND PRACTICE 150-52 (1995).
18. MOORE, supra note 17, at412.
19. S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. SCOR 4370th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (2001); S.C. Res. 1373.
U.N. SCOR 4385th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (2001).
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but it could not decide whether the threat to use them would be unlawful. 20 A
fortiori, the mere possession without a threat is not unlawful under general
international law. 21 When Israeli jets bombed a nuclear reactor under construction
at Osirik, Iraq in 1981, the U.N. Security Council condemned the bombing,
22
despite the threat nuclear weapons in the hands of Saddam Hussein could pose for
Israel. The Council found "the military attack by Israel in clear violation of the
Charter of the United Nations and the norms of international conduct.,
23
Armed attacks, did occur on September 11 th, however, so the United States
had the right to take self-defensive measures following that day. It has no right of
self-defense to eliminate weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. It certainly has no
right of self-defense to attack a state to eliminate persons who might be planning to
possess weapons of mass destruction.
If the requisite armed attack occurs or will occur imminently, the response to
the armed attack must aim at those responsible for the attack. If the response aims
at the territory of a state, that state must be legally responsible for the attack before
it may be targeted in self-defense. Legal responsibility follows if the territorial
state used its own agents to carry out the attack; if it controlled or supported the
attackers; possibly where it failed to control the attacks; or where it subsequently
adopted the acts of the attackers as its own.
24
The case can be made that the September 11 th attackers were so closely
aligned and supported by Afghanistan's de facto leaders, the Taliban, as to give
rise to Afghanistan's responsibility.25 No comparable case can be made, or indeed,
any case for Iraq's responsibility for September 11 th. In the Spring of 2002, no
evidence of a link had been found. Early reports that an Al-Qaeda member met
with Iraq's ambassador to the Czech Republic before the attack were subsequently
denied by Czech officials.26
Even if a link could be found, the United States also needs clear and
convincing evidence of future attacks. 27  A response in self-defense must be
defensive in nature. It must aim at deterring or degrading offensive capability.
With no evidence of future attacks, responsive armed attacks would only be
unlawful reprisals or punishment.28
The United States had evidence before Operation Enduring Freedom that Al-
20. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 l.C.J. 226 at para. 105 (July
8)[hereinafter Nuclear Weapons].
21. Cf. Nuclear Weapons supra note 20..
22. See S.C. Res. 487, U.N. SCOR 2288th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/487 (1981).
23. Id.
24. In the Hostages Case, the ICJ found Iran was responsible for the hostage-taking at the U.S.
Embassy because of the "failure on the part of the Iranian authorities to oppose the armed attack by
militants" and "the almost immediate endorsement by those authorities of the situation thus created."
United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3, 42 (May 24).
25. See Beard, supra note 1, at 582-583.
26. Atta's Canceled Czech, WALL ST. J., May 15, 2002, at A18.
27. Mary Ellen O'Connell, Evidence of Terror, 7 J. OF CONFLICT & SEC. L. 19, 30 (2002).
28. Id. at 29, 30.
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Qaeda planned more attacks. That evidence was confirmed by documents and
video tapes found in Afghanistan during Enduring Freedom. 29 As of Spring 2002,
no evidence linked Iraq to Al-Qaeda and its plans to attack American interests, past
or future.
The final element of lawful self-defense requires that the response be carried
out only if the principles of necessity and proportionality can be respected.
Necessity restricts the use of military force to the attainment of legitimate military
objectives. Proportionality requires that the force needed to attain those military
objectives be weighed against possible civilian casualties. If the loss of innocent
life or destruction of property is out-of-proportion to the importance of the
objective, the objective must be abandoned.3 °
The amount of force used during the first weeks of Enduring Freedom
appeared necessary and proportionate - certainly while the United States restrained
the Northern Alliance from going to Kabul. Secretary Powell indicated that the
United States did not aim to eliminate the Taliban entirely. His approach tracks
the international legal rules.3'
Degrading the Taliban's offensive ability was a legitimate objective. The care
taken in targeting to avoid civilian casualties kept the force used proportionate.
Changing the government of Afghanistan was arguably not necessary for the
defense of the United States. The United States warned the Northern Alliance not
to enter Kabul, though, in the end, the United States seems to have been overtaken
by events when the Northern Alliance took the city. After the Taliban fell in mid-
December, however, the continued use of massive aerial bombardment was
arguably well out-of-proportion to the objective of capturing small groups and
individual Al-Qaeda members scattered in the Afghan mountains. The shift to
ground forces in mid-January was far more protective of civilians.
It is extremely difficult to understand how a massive invasion of Iraq would
meet the requirements of necessity and proportionality. These principles apply
even if the reason for going to war is unlawful. In the case of Iraq, the announced
reason for the invasion is to prevent Saddam Hussein from obtaining weapons of
mass destruction. Experts consistently testify, however, that the robust embargo
on Iraq is preventing the regime from getting the inputs for effective weapons of
mass destruction. An invasion does not appear necessary for the objective.
Continuing with the embargo will not cost the civilian lives of an invasion,
29. Tape Shows Bin Laden Celebrating, WASH. POST, Dec. 11, 2001, at C14.
30. Proportionality prohibits force "which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life,
injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in
relation to concrete and direct military advantage anticipated." Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protections of Victims of International Armed
Conflicts (Protocol I), Dec. 12, 1977, art. 51, para. 5(b), 1152 U.N.T.S. 3, 16 I.L.M. 1391, 1413. "In
the law of armed conflict, the notion of proportionality is based on the fundamental principle that
belligerents do not enjoy an unlimited choice of means to inflict damage on the enemy." Judith Gail
Gardam, Proportionality and Force in International Law, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 391 (1993).
31. Serge Schmemann, UN. Envoy Says All Options are Open on a Post-Taliban Afghanistan,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2001, at B4.
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especially if the embargo is more targeted. Estimates of the deaths from invasion
being suggested in Spring 2002 were in the thousands.3 2 We have a proportionate
way to achieve the objective through an embargo on inputs and verification by
inspections. Arguably some force could be used to get the inspectors back into
Iraq or to protect them once there, though that would really need a Security
Council authorization. [As this article goes to press, the Security Council has
adopted Resolution 1441 (Nov. 8, 2002) authorizing security guards for
inspectors.]
B. Security Council Authorization
The U.N. Security Council has spoken relative to both the use of force in
Afghanistan and Iraq. It had not, however, provided the requisite authorization for
force as of October 7 in Afghanistan or March 2002 in Iraq. This conclusion will
be discussed first before turning to the law of self-defense governing force in the
absence of the Security Council authorization. With regard to September 11 th,
Security Council resolutions adopted in the wake of the attacks refer to the right of
self-defense. In particular, Resolution 1373 (September 28) reveals the Council's
consensus as to self-defense and terrorism shortly before Enduring Freedom was
launched:
The Security Council, Reaffirming its resolutions 1269 (1999) of 19 October 1999
and 1368 (2001) of 12 September 2001, Reaffirming also its unequivocal
condemnation of the terrorist attacks which took place in New York, Washington,
D.C. and Pennsylvania on 11 September 2001, and expressing its determination to
prevent all such acts, Reaffirming the inherent right of individual or collective
self-defense as recognized by the Charter of the United Nations as reiterated in
resolution 1368 (2001), Reaffirming the need to combat by all means, in
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, threats to international peace
and security caused by terrorist acts..
33
The operative part of the Resolution mandates economic sanctions to combat
terrorism. It does not authorize the use of armed force, nor does it explicitly
authorize the United States to use armed force in self-defense to the September
11 th attacks. As argued above, the Resolution supports the conclusion that the
September 11 th attacks were significant enough to trigger the right of self-defense,
if the other conditions of legality are met. In several subsequent resolutions
relating to terrorism and the situation in Afghanistan neither the U.N. Security
Council nor the General Assembly condemned Enduring Freedom as a violation of
32. "But a ground invasion of Iraq might involve hundreds or even thousands of U.S. casualties,
while tens of thousands of Iraqi civilians would certainly have to die before there was any chance of
breaking Saddam's will through bombing alone." Anatole Kaletsky, America is Becoming its Own
Worst Enemy, THE TIMES OF LONDON, Mar. 14, 2002, available at WL 4190063; Kenneth M. Pollack,
Next Stop Baghdad? United States' Foreign Policy, 81 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 32, 43 (2002) ("The
casualties incurred during such an operation might well be greater than during the Afghan or Gulf Wars,
but they are unlikely to be catastrophic.").
33. S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. SCOR 4385th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (2001).
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the Charter.34 Still, these resolutions are not authorization. Nor do they indicate
that the U.N. Security Council would be taking over America's defense as it may
do under Article 51 and did do regarding Kuwait in the Gulf War.
Indeed, as a result of the Council's active role in the liberation of Kuwait
from Iraq in the Gulf War, it passed numerous resolutions, including, significantly,
Resolution 687.36 Resolution 687 sets out the terms of the cease-fire between the
coalition forces and Iraq. Some scholars have argued that this Resolution
authorizes an invasion of Iraq or at least creates conditions allowing for a lawful
invasion. Professor Yoram Dinstein at the March 2002 Meeting of the American
Society of International Law argued as follows:
As for Iraq, it must be pointed out that the situation there is sui generis. The Gulf
War that began on August 2, 1990 is not over yet. The United States-led
coalition's military actions - conducted in 1991 -were an exercise of collective
self-defense, with the full prior blessing of the Security Council. There was a
cease-fire, which Iraq has consistently breached (by expelling U.N. disarmament
supervisors and otherwise). The United States can always resume hostilities,
irrespective of the presence of Bin Laden in Iraq.
37
There are several weaknesses in this argument. First, it is clear that the
Security Council took over the defense of Kuwait, as per Article 51. It ordered
economic sanctions and restricted the onset of hostilities until sanctions had been
given a chance to work. Neither the coalition nor Kuwait itself could start military
action against Iraq until the date set by the U.N. Security Council. The Council did
far more than give the coalition "its blessing." Second, the cease-fire agreement is
plainly between the U.N. Security Council and Iraq, not the coalition and Iraq.
Thus, it is for the U.N. Security Council to determine if it is aggrieved about non-
compliance with the terms of the agreement, not the coalition. Finally, Resolution
687 contains enforcement provisions to be used in the case of Iraqi non-
compliance. Economic sanctions remain in place until all the terms are met and,
should further action be required, Paragraph 34 of Resolution 687, states that the
Security Council "[d]ecides to remain seized of the matter and to take such further
steps as may be required for the implementation of the present resolution and to
secure peace and security in the area.",38 Finally, in the more than ten years since
the liberation of Kuwait, the U.N. Security Council has exercised oversight over
34. See Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, G.A. Res. 56/88, U.N. GAOR, 56 Sess,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/88 (Jan. 24, 2002); S.C. Res. 1378, U.N. SCOR, 4415th mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1378 (2001); S.C. Res. 1383, U.N. SCOR, 4434th mtg. U.N. Doc. S/RES/1383 (2001).
35. See Mary Ellen O'Connell, Enforcing the Prohibition on the Use of Force: The UN. 's
Response to Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait, 15 S. 1ll. U. L. J. 453, 479 (1991).
36. S.C. Res. 687, U.N. SCOR, 44th Sess., 2871st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (1989), available
at 30 I.L.M. 847 (1991).
37. Yoram Dinstein, Remarks, 2002 PROC. ASIL (forthcoming); see also Ruth Wedgwood, The
Enforcement of Security Council Resolution 687: The Threat of Force Against Iraq 's Weapons of Mass
Destruction, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 724 (1998).
38. S.C. Res. 687, supra note 36, at 854.
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Iraqi compliance. 39 The coalition is no longer in existence. It ceased to exist with
the adoption of Resolution 687 - its task completed.
When Professor Ruth Wedgwood took a similar position on the meaning of
the unperfected cease-fire she only aimed to defend bombing Iraq, not invading.4 °
Once Kuwait was liberated, the overwhelming consensus was that the war was
over. Iraq and Kuwait normalized diplomatic relations in March 2002, an odd
thing to do in the middle of hostilities.
Even the use of bombing to enforce the secondary aspects of the Gulf War
cease-fire, is highly questionable under our analysis of Resolution 687. When the
United States and United Kingdom bombed Iraq in December 1998, to force
Saddam Hussein to comply with the weapons regime, France, Russia and China all
condemned the action. The United States and United Kingdom have also regularly
used force to police no-fly zones over northern and southern Iraq. This use of
force would be equally unlawful, except for the fact that for the first year or two
after the adoption of Resolution 687, France, too, joined in this policing and other
permanent members of the U.N. Security Council did not condemn the use. It may
be that in the case of the no-fly zones, we have acquiescence to the use of force by
the United States and United Kingdom. Once such as acquiescence has occurred,
it would take a U.N. Security Council resolution to condemn the policing. But the
United States and United Kingdom will veto any attempt to condemn their actions
and so the policing remains, arguably, lawful. The contrast with the weapons
regime is clear. The Council never acquiesced in the use of force to enforce the
weapons regime, and the December 1998 bombing never accomplished any
constructive outcome, quite the contrary.
C. Alternatives to Self-Defense
The law of self-defense did not unreasonably restrict U.S. action following
September 11 th. It does restrict what the United States might wish to do regarding
Iraq. If the United States nonetheless ignores the law, it will commit an act of
aggression. Such a grave violation of international law will have serious negative
consequences for the restraints on force, restraints which serve the United States
and the world in providing normative standards for the community and aiding in
some small way toward achieving peace. Undermining norms, and peace itself,
will be a high price to pay, especially in light of alternatives that exist in
international law for those cases where military force is unlawful to achieve
national policy. This section discusses alternatives to self-defense in the case of
Iraq: both unlawful aggression and lawful countermeasures.
The United Nations General Assembly adopted a "Definition of Aggression"
in 1974 .4 The Assembly concluded that aggression is "the use of force by a State
against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another
39. S.C. Res. 687, supra note 36, at 851-52.
40. See Wedgwood, supra note 37, at 727.
41. Definition of Aggression Resolution, G.A. Res. 3314, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) 2, at
142, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974) [hereinafter Definition of Aggression].
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State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations,
as set out in this definition. 42 The Definition excludes insignificant uses of force
that otherwise meet the elements in the Definition. The drafters of the crime
aggression agree that aggression also is not an insignificant use of force. In March
2002, members of the Arab League concluded that an attack on Iraq would be an
act of aggression. They announced that any such attack would be. treated as an
attack on each of them.43
In conditions that do not justify self-defense, avoiding acts of aggression does
not require an actor to refrain from all coercive acts. Countermeasures are also an
option for a state responding to another state's violations of international law. For
example, in cases where the victim of an armed attack has no evidence of future
attacks, countermeasures may be used until the wrongdoer provides a remedy for
the wrong. Appropriate remedies can include compensation and assurances of
non-repetition. Countermeasures are actions that violate the law but are taken in
response to prior violations. 4 Countermeasures must be proportional to the injury
suffered and are available only if the parties involved have no prior commitment to
resort first to the means of binding dispute settlement (as is the case, for example,
with trade disputes which must first be submitted to the WTO.)45 Countermeasures
may be highly coercive, though they may not include violations of the U.N.
Charter, human rights or diplomatic immunity.46 Countermeasures may be taken
by the injured state but in the case of universal jurisdiction crimes, any state may
take measures.47  The attacks of September 1lth involved international acts of
intentional killing on a scale to qualify as crimes against humanity, which are
universal jurisdiction crimes.48  Any state's courts may exercise judicial
jurisdiction over persons accused of universal jurisdiction crimes. 49 Any state may
aid in the enforcement of the law prohibiting such crimes by taking
countermeasures.
42. See Definition of Aggression supra note 41 at 143.
43. See Shanker & Sanger, supra note 7, at 1.
44. Case Concerning the Gabdikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.) 1997 I.C.J. 1, 47, paras
82-87 (Sept. 25); Air Services Agreement Case (U.S. v. Fr.), 18 RI.A.A. 416, para. 83 (1978)
[hereinafter Air Services]. See also Draft Articles on State Responsibility Provisionally Adopted by the
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In the case of Iraq, there is already a regime of sanctions in place to deal with
any attempts by Iraq to acquire weapons of mass destruction. It might be possible
for the United States to persuade the U.N. Security Council to do more to get the
weapons inspectors back in Iraq and then to provide them with greater security so
they are not as vulnerable to being forced out again - that would presumably also
require commitments by the United States not to abuse the weapons inspection
regime by sending U.S. spies with the inspectors.
Otherwise, it is difficult to think what further violations against the United
States itself would result in a case of countermeasures against Iraq. If the United
States should acquire clear and convincing evidence that Iraq is harboring terrorists
rather than trying or extraditing them, it might be possible for the United States to
infiltrate agents onto the territory of Iraq to bring those accused persons out. This
might be a justifiable countermeasure. A police action or incursion is short of
armed force and is arguably proportional to the wrong of harboring terrorists.
However, support for this interpretation of the law is limited. We have examples
of police actions and the like on the state territory or areas beyond national
jurisdiction which states treat as not amounting to prohibited armed force. 50 These
police actions are better classified as de minimis uses of force. The best known
case is the "volunteer" action to kidnap Eichmann from Argentina on behalf of
Israel. 5' The action was condemned.5 2 Yet it occurred before the development of
the "try or extradite" principle. Israel could not justify its action as a
countermeasure because it was not responding to a prior wrong by Argentina.
However, the kidnapping could hardly be characterized as a use of armed force or
an otherwise-prohibited measure. The best approach for a state interest in taking
forceful measures on the territory of another state is to seek U.N. Security Council
authorization for such an action. Failing such authorization, a state does have
alternatives to full-scale self-defense.
II. THE LAW OF EXCEPTIONALISM
Yet, the Bush administration's position is equivocal with regard to respecting
international law in the case of Iraq. The invasion planners give little indication
that they are concerned with the law of self-defense - at least with respect to the
United States. In the past the United States has sought to characterize its uses of
force as within the international rule of law - even if that meant manipulating facts
50. States may use minimal armed force to enforce the law without violating Article 2(4).
Minimal use of force on the high seas or in air space over the high seas is permissible. For example,
states may use armed force in affecting arrests by shooting across the bow of a pirate ship on the high
seas or dropping a bomb on an oil tanker in international waters to prevent pollution damage. In 1967,
the UK bombed the Torrey Canyon, an oil tanker which had run aground in international waters and
threatened serious oil pollution damage to the UK coast. See In Re Barracuda Tanker Corp., 409 F.2d
1013 (2nd Cir. 1968). The action was universally approved and codified at Article 216 of the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature, Dec. 10, 1982, Art. 107, UN Doc.
A/Conf.62/122 (1982), reprinted in United Nations, Official Text of the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea with Annexes and Index, UN Sales No. E.83.v.5 (1983), 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982).
51. Louis HENKIN, ETAL., INTERNATIONAL LAw 1083 (3d ed. 1993).
52. Id. at 1085.
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as in the cases of Vietnam and Grenada. The United States has officially argued its
uses of force were lawful. The invasion of Iraq, however, presents a significant
new development, which builds on the Clinton Administration's position,
demonstrated during Kosovo that NATO should not be subject to the Security
Council authorization. Some U.S. foreign policy planners apparently believe the
United States has a privileged, exceptional position in international relations and
that puts it above international law.
The Bush Administration's antipathy for Iraq was evident from its first days
in office. The Administration launched a large bombing mission over the no-fly
zones of Iraq. President Bush said: "Saddam Hussein has got to understand we
expect him to conform to the agreement that he signed after Desert Storm."53
Around the tenth anniversary of the end of the ground war to liberate Kuwait
(February 1991), the debate in Washington policy circles was all about the failure
of the first Bush Administration to take that war to Baghdad to oust Saddam
Hussein. In the summer of 2001, the Bush Administration held firm against
pressure to lift the sanctions on Iraq.54 Within days of September 1 th, a former
secretary of state, Lawrence Eagleburger, said: "You have to kill some of these
people; even if they were not directly involved, they need to be hit.",55 Deputy
Defense Secretary, Paul Wolfowitz, even said the United States should "end
states" that support terrorism. 6 Reportedly, he wants the United States to destroy
Iraq, despite the lack of evidence that it supported the September 1 th atrocity.
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Apparently, Secretary of State Colin Powell was urging a different line. At any
rate, no attack on Iraq took place during Operation Enduring Freedom against
Afghanistan. But during his State of the Union address, President Bush again
focused on Iraq, including it with Iran and North Korea in an "axis of evil." 58 In
March 2002, Vice President Cheney visited the Middle East to rally support for an
invasion.59  Evidently, the Israeli-Palestinian crisis was diverting the
Administration's attention from the invasion, but the Guardian newspaper of
London reported contractors were moving U.S. personnel and facilities out of
Saudi Arabia to other Gulf States willing to allow the United States to launch the
invasion from their territory. By March, the word in Washington was about a
September invasion involving around 80,000 troops. The March/April issue of
Foreign Affairs contained an article by Kenneth Pollack, who from 1999 to 2001
was the Director of Gulf Affairs on the White House National Security Council.
The article provides a detailed brief on why and how to invade.
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Pollock advises on 200,000-300,000 troops, 700-1000 aircraft, and from one
to five carrier battle groups. 60 "The casualties incurred during such an operation
might well be greater than during the Afghan or Gulf Wars, but they are unlikely to
be catastrophic.'
The biggest headaches for the United States are likely to stem not from the
invasion itself but from its aftermath. Once the country has been conquered and
Saddam's regime driven from power, the United States would be left "owning" a
country of 22 million people ravaged by more than two decades of war,
totalitarian misrule, and severe deprivation. The invaders would get to decide the
composition and form of a future Iraqi government - both an opportunity and a
burden. Some form of unitary but federalized state would probably best suit the
bewildering array of local and foreign interests involved, but ideally this decision
would be a collective one: as in Afghanistan, the United States should try to turn
the question of future Iraqi political arrangements over to the U.N., or possibly the
Arab League, thus shedding and spreading some responsibility for the outcome.
Alternatively, it might bring in those countries most directly affected by the
outcome - the Saudis, Kuwaitis, Jordanians, and Turks - both to co-opt them and
as an incentive for their diplomatic support. In the end, of course, it would be up
to the United States to make sure that a post-Saddam Iraq did not slip into chaos
like Lebanon in the 1980s or Afghanistan in the 1990s, creating spillover effects
in the region and raising the possibility of a new terrorist haven.
In late April, the New York Times reported that a similar blueprint for
invasion was on the Bush Administration's drawing board.6 3 President Bush,
while visiting Berlin on May 17th denied he had war plans on his desk, but the
Washington Post reported on May 24"h that General Tommy Franks had briefed top
decision-makers on an invasion for which he wanted 200,000 troops. 64 The Post
reported top military commanders persuaded civilian leaders to at least delay the
invasion until 2003 or to reconsider it altogether. The military is chiefly concerned
with the difficulty of an invasion and potentially high casualties. 65
As mentioned above, at the Arab League summit in March, Arab leaders
stated an invasion of Iraq would be an act of aggression.66 European leaders who
just three years ago fully debated the legality of intervening in Kosovo, concluding
it was unlawful, but allowing it anyway, did not debate the legality of invading
Iraq in Spring 2002. The United States did not request help from other countries,
and appeared resolved on invasion, so, the Europeans did not join their Arab
colleagues. No doubt they feared the implications of pronouncing that the United
States has committed aggression. The failure to name aggression, however, along
with the invasion itself will have repercussions for both the law and the U.N.
60. Pollack, supra note 32, at 43.
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63. See Shanker & Sanger, supra note 7, at 1.
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Swaying Bush, Pentagon, WASH. POST, May 24,2002, at AOt.
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NATO's intervention in Kosovo had major repercussions despite the fact that
European governments were adamant that it should not. It is surely less shocking
today to see the United States contemplating a war of aggression against Iraq, a
war without the U.N. Security Council's sanction or condemnation since the
NATO use of force against Yugoslavia. Secretary of State Albright at a NATO
meeting in December 1998 said: "let me say a word about [Security Council]
mandates. NATO will-in all cases-act in accordance with the principles of the
United Nations Charter, while continuing to address this issue on a case-by-case
basis.' 67 In June 1998, U.S. Secretary of Defense, William Cohen had said that
NATO would not need a U.N. Security Council authorization to intervene in
Kosovo.68
The Clinton Administration spoke of NATO but the U.S. dominance of
NATO meant it was really speaking of the U.S. When the bombing of Yugoslavia
by NATO began on March 24, 1999, without the U.N. Security Council
authorization, the United States did not issue an official legal justification for the
action. The United States did not even care enough about the rules to manipulate
69the facts or stretch interpretations. Some in the Bush Administration hold the
view that no multilateral organization authorization or other justification under law
to invade Iraq is necessary. Rather, the United States is enjoying a position of
privilege in the international community and is being allowed to do so by other
states, including Europeans, perhaps best in a position to challenge it. As Detlev
Vagts has observed:
One increasingly sees the United States designated as the hegemonic (or
indispensable, dominant, or preeminent) power. Those employing this
terminology include former officials of high rank as well as widely read
publicists. The French, for their part, use the term "hyper-power." A passage by
Charles Krauthammer in Time best captures the spirit" "America is no mere
international citizen. It is the dominant power in the world, more dominant than
any since Rome. Accordingly America is in a position to reshape norms, alter
expectations and create new realities. How? By unapologetic and implacable
demonstrations of will."
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Saddam Hussein is an international criminal who no one wants to be seen
defending. Nevertheless, allowing the United States to move to a position above
the law will have repercussions for the law. Those repercussions will unlikely be
the ones the United States wants. The United States wants an orderly world under
the rule of law for everyone, but some also want the U.S. to have a right to pick
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68. Id. at 76.
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it followed the British lead and argued the Yugoslav bombing came close to being justified. In the
weeks before the case, however, repeated calls to the Legal Adviser's Office at the U.S. Department of
State yielded promises of return calls that never came, referrals to telephone numbers for disconnected
phones, and recommendations to call the public affairs office, which had no idea what the request
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and choose the rules it obeys. This is not how law works. Law is based on a
psychological element of belief and commitment. When these are absent, there
can be no law. If the United States breaks this fiction and declares itself above the
law, it will help break down the commitment to law generally in the international
community.
The plan to invade Iraq jettisons American leadership toward a world order
under the rule of law that began with Roosevelt's vision for the United Nations,
continued with George H.W. Bush's declaration after the defeat of Iraq in 1991,
through to George W. Bush's report to the U.N. Security Council on the need for
Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001.
